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I am much disposed to like the world as I find it, and to doubt my own
judgment as to what would mend it.
Benjamin Franklin (1771)

Does the Iraq war, both in its domestic and foreign effects, signal a crisis at the
heart of American liberalism, raising profound questions about its staying powers and
capacities? Is the United States moving a breakneck pace away from its core liberal and
political traditions, in preference for understandings closer to those of Nazi political
philosopher Carl Schmidtt?

Does Laurence Tribe’s decision not to go forward with a

new edition of his canonical casebook on constitutional law signal that the nation has
reached a moment of crisis that portends the end of our Hartzian liberal tradition?1
In the immortal words of Woody Allen, “Excuse me, I’m due back on the planet
earth.”2 These questions, which seem to have been asked in all earnestness, raise more
questions about the questioners that they do about the state of American liberalism.

A

substantive response to any one of these questions would be a paper in and of itself -and I am not particularly interested here in providing one, beyond a few, admittedly
rapid-fire (and glib), replies. On Iraq, I note that every war America has had, going back
to the very beginning, has raised the same questions, and, as such, this war is no more a
challenge to Hartz than the entirety of American history is a challenge to Hartz (which is
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another argument altogether). As for our ability to export our liberal values, these too go
way back, although, as a practical matter, perhaps less far, since America’s ability to
project is power and values in the international arena (vis-à-vis the British and the
French, for example) is a much more recent affair. The Schmidtt charge is more a matter
of rhetoric than substance: the executive has often asserted sweeping powers in wartime,
and there is plenty of warrant for this the Constitution and (broad, though certainly
contestable) Hamiltonian readings of executive power, without the implication that
‘Amerika’ is on the fast track to fascism. It is true that when the executive power to act
beyond the strict requirements of law is asserted, people should worry (and they do). But
this power (whether in the form of the prerogative, or emergency powers, or the nature of
executive power), as Locke wrote about, and the Founders knew, has long been part of
our political inheritance and of the broader liberal political tradition. As for Tribe, the
notion that his reading of the Constitution, which, however influential it has been, is a
relatively recent invention, associated with only one version of liberalism (New
Deal/Great Society), is coextensive with the American liberal tradition as a whole, going
back to the founding, is simply wrong.3
More interesting is the origins of these panics themselves. The roots of this panic
– which has a special grip on activists in contemporary, influential, single-issue legal
interest groups, and academics – are two-fold. While it is certainly possible to
emphasize the anti-American and anti-patriotic strains of this panic (which is readily
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traceable as a holdover of key strains of the New Left of the 1960s),4 I will instead
emphasize here two sets of roots that are as American as fireworks on the Fourth. The
first is the habitual ‘Don’t tread on me’ orneriness of Americans about the
aggrandizement of government power, and sports on our rights – a sign that some of the
old impulses that Hartz himself has described are as alive as ever.5 The second is the
anger of frustrated reformers, who (in an echo of dynamics that also played out at the
time of the First World War) see the war on terror (indeed, the attacks of September 11
themselves) as a maddeningly frustrating distraction from all manner of more important
projects of domestic reform.6 The reformist tradition, like the liberal tradition, is
constitutive of American political culture: it is certainly not simply a product of the
conservative-anathematized 1960s. What is distinctive about its contemporary valence is
that it has come to define the establishment of an entire (and highly visible) set of
American institutions (colleges and universities), and players in the public policy process
(stridently visible single-issue advocacy groups) which are overwhelmingly reformist in
their outlooks and perceived institutional missions. When we combine the liberal
impulse, with the reformist impulse in the context of an attack on the country, we can
understand the wartime panic amongst the legal liberal advocacy establishment, and
amongst the professors.
I will address the second first.
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Remembering the Reform Tradition
Reformers may not be the best judges of their own place in the Universe.7

Contemporary accounts of the axes of American political thought tend to
emphasize the opposition between liberalism and communitarianism. A much-cited
addition to these poles was the addition of “ascriptive Americanism,” that is (in essence)
illiberal racism and other forms of bigotry. 8 Transparently missing from this framework
was the category of “reformism,” which was once at the forefront, but now seems to have
disappeared, from discussions of the architecture of American political thought.9 To be
sure, this is not to say that the substantive politics treated by scholars of reformism have
disappeared from view: much of that has been picked up by scholars of race, and social
movements, and others. What has fallen by the wayside, however, is an identification of
the reformer as a distinctive political “type,” with a distinctive social and political vision
(not to mention psychological orientation). Since so many contemporary academics fit
this type, it is hardly surprising that, in contemporary academic work, it no longer exists.
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An earlier generation of scholars – ironically enough, of the same consensus
generation as Hartz – was not so blinkered. Richard Hofstadter’s, Christopher Lasch’s,
and Ronald Walters’s description of the reformist type or personality will, when
described, seem so familiar to contemporary academics as to disappear. This familiarity,
however, should not lead us to discount its distinctiveness.
The reformer, according to these scholars (who focused primarily on nineteenth
century prototypes) will understand himself as not being wholly in and of his times, but
above it.10 Reformers “regarded themselves as outsiders whose critical distance from
their societies enabled them to see its flaws.” They held the “basic assumption … that
they were special people, either quite detached from their time and place or else having a
peculiar position within it.”11 As such, as Christopher Lasch noted, despite their upper or
middle class backgrounds, they will have a notable propensity to identify themselves with
society’s outsiders and outcasts.12
Reformers will make a critical assessment of what is wrong with society (and the
country), and needs correcting, that is, that there are social evils that they can identify,
and, if successful, cure. And they come to identify the purpose of education itself with
revealing to their students, who might not otherwise see them, the existence of these
wrongs and evils, and, they hope, mobilizing them to work to take on these wrongs and
evils – which are identified and understood as “social problems.” The commitment to
remedying these wrongs, scholars of reformism demonstrate, can assume what is readily
identifiable as a religious dimension in the lives of these reformers. Along the same
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lines, education for them becomes a form of evangelism.13 They conceive of education,
that is, not simply as a process involving the transmission of values or the creation of an
informed citizenry, but as an instrument of social change. They will see this as especially
necessary given what they take to be the “self-evident unreasonableness” of much of the
social and political system under which they live.14
Of course, they will closely identify themselves with the cause of progress. In so
doing, they will see themselves as part of the vanguard of reasonableness in their own
times that is “part of some grand process stretching across the centuries.”15 Put
otherwise, they are inheritors of a legacy of progress.
Scholars of reformism have noted the propensity of reformers to be committed to
a slate of causes, which they feel, in their own times, fit together coherently, but, viewed
historically, may seem unusual (for example, a common profile in the 1840s would
include simultaneous commitments to temperance, anti-Sunday mail delivery,
antislavery, and public education).16 Reformers, as a distinctive type, may be closely
aligned with popular, democratic political movements.

But it is important to recognize

that, in significant respects, they are not really of them.

They “tend to expect that the

masses of people, whose actions at certain moments in history coincide with some of
these beliefs, will share their other convictions as a matter of logic and principle.” But
this is commonly not the case. As Richard Hofstadter noted, they have a tendency to
“remake the image of popular rebellion closer to their heart’s desire.”17
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The Dark Side of Reform
To simply note that reformers are not “types” to contemporary scholars does not
come close to doing justice to the place of these figures and their beliefs in American
political thought today. For many they are either unremarkably ordinary (if, thankfully,
more public-spirited than most), or, alternatively, the very definition of heroic.
Some, in earlier times, saw more clearly, and critically. Most prominent amongst
both the clear and critical, perhaps, was Nathaniel Hawthorne, whose The Blithedale
Romance is a fictionalized portrait of utopian Brook Farm community.

In this novel,

Hawthorne provides a devastating portrait of the reform-obsessed, public-spirited
philanthropist, Hollingsworth, a man resolutely committed to the reform and
rehabilitation of criminals, as a distinctively American social type.
In two passages in particular, Hawthorne (in the voice of the book’s narrator, a
curious sojourner in the utopian community) dissects the reformer as type:

[H]ad the system at which he was so enraged18 combined almost any amount of
human wisdom, spiritual insight, and imaginative beauty, I question whether
Hollingsworth’s mind was in a fit condition to receive it. I began to discern that
he had come among us actuated by no real sympathy with our feelings and our
hope, but chiefly because we were estranging ourselves from the world with
which his lonely and exclusive object in life had already put him at odds.
Hollingsworth must have been originally endowed with a great spirit of
benevolence, deep enough and warm enough to be the source or as much
disinterested good as Providence often allows a human being the privilege of
conferring upon his fellows. This native instinct yet lived within him. I myself
had profited by it in my necessity….. Such causal circumstances as were here
involved would quicken his divine power of sympathy, and make him seem, while
their influence lasted, the tenderest man and the truest friend on earth. But, by
and by, you missed the tenderness of yesterday, and grew drearily conscious that
Hollingsworth had a closer friend than ever you could be; and this friend was the
cold spectral monster which he had himself conjured up, and on which he was
wasting all the warmth of his heart, and of which, at last – a these men of a
18
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mighty purpose so invariably do, -- he had grown to be the bond-slave. It was his
philanthropic theory. This was a result exceedingly sad to contemplate,
considering that it had been mainly brought about by the very ardor and
exuberance of his philanthropy. Sad, indeed, but by no means unusual. He had
taught his benevolence to pour exclusively through one channel; so that there was
nothing to spare for other great manifestations of love to man, nor scarcely for the
nutriment of individual attachments, unless they could minister, in some way, to
the terrible egotism he mistook for an angel of God…. He knew absolutely
nothing, except in a single direction, where he had thought so energetically, and
felt to such a depth that, no doubt, the entire reason and justice of the universe
appeared to be concentrated thitherward…. [I] t required all the constancy of
friendship to restrain his associates from pronouncing him an intolerable bore.
Such prolonged fiddling upon one string, -- such multiform presentation of one
idea!19
And:

He was not altogether human. There was something else in Hollingsworth
besides flesh and blood, and sympathies and affections, and celestial spirit. This
is always true of those men who have surrendered themselves to an overruling
purpose. It does not so much impel them from without, nor even operate as a
motive power within, but grows incorporate with all that they think and feel, and
finally converts them into little else save that one principle. When such begins to
be the predicament, it is not cowardice, but wisdom, to avoid these victims. They
have no heart, no sympathy, no reason, no conscience. They will keep no friend,
unless he make himself the mirror of their purpose; they will smite you and slay
you, and trample your dead corpse under foot, all the more readily, if you take the
first step with them, and cannot take the second, and the third, and every other
step of their terribly straight path. They have an idol, to which they consecrate
themselves high-priest, and deem it holy work to offer sacrifices of whatever is
most precious; and never once seem to suspect – so cunning has the devil been
with them – that this false deity, in whose iron features, immitigable to all the rest
of mankind, they see only benignity and love, is but a spectrum of the very priest
himself, projected upon the surrounding darkness. And the higher and purer the
original object, and the more unselfishly it may have been taken up, the slighter is
the probability that they can be led to recognize the process by which godlike
benevolence has been debased into all-devouring egotism.20
19

Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Blithedale Romance, 78-79.
Hawthorne, Blithedale Romance, 92-93. He adds: “Of course, I am perfectly aware that the above
statement is exaggerated, in the attempt to make it adequate. Professed philanthropists have gone far; but
no originally good man, I presume, ever went quite so far as this. Let the reader abate whatever he deems
fit. The paragraph may remain, however, both for its truth and its exaggeration, as strongly expressive the
tendencies which were really operative in Hollingsworth, and as exemplifying the kind of error into which
my mode of observation was calculated to lead me.”
20

9
Reform and the Modern State
The modern American state is a reform state. It was built through the influence
of reformers, first in the burst of abolitionism, and then through successive waves of
Populism, Progressivism, and then a succession of social movements involving labor,
civil rights, and feminism (amongst others).

Reformism shaped the institutional

architecture of the modern state. In so doing, it built an incentive structure that
privileged, and gave undue weight, to both reformist influence, and reformist ideas.
When we speak of the role of “advocacy,” as opposed to “interest” groups, we
acknowledge this departure. And when we accord a special role for social scientific
expertise in law, we privilege work that, in both its origins, and its contemporary reality,
is often the work of latter day Hollingsworths, (if inevitably, usually in more palatable
forms):21 by men and women committed less to the broader system, and a set of limits,
than fired and obsessed by a single cause – advocacy-group liberalism, if you will.
Is it worth isolating reformism as a distinctive strain of American political
thought? Might not we simply situate reformers with the preexisting categories of
liberalism, communitarianism, and ascriptive Americanism? There is little doubt, for
instance that, depending on the cause (or amalgamation of causes), reformism can be
either liberal or illiberal. Doing so, however, will tend to obscure some the operations of
the reformist mindset – be it liberal or illiberal – that are on broad display in prominent
political contexts, including the reaction many had to the September 11 attacks (and the
Iraq War).
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The predisposition of many sympathetic to the reformers themselves will be to see
them as defending American liberalism, at a time it is newly under siege by an
increasingly Schmittian wartime state – hence the panic about whether, at long last
Hartz’s America is approaching its end. This is because the limits placed on individual
liberty in the current context as a result of the September 11 attacks, and the war – which,
by historical standards, (other than to the panicked) are strikingly de minimus – are the
sort of wartime limits to which reformers are, in the context of the modern centralized
state, are likely to be most sensitive. At the same time, the limits placed on individual
liberty by the routine operation of that state, since the early twentieth century, and by
contemporary reform agendas (such as (illiberal) feminism and ethno-centric, racialist
multiculturalism), are the sort of limits to which reformers are, in the context of the
modern centralized state, utterly indifferent, if not aggressively in favor of.
Perceived descents into another Red Scare, or neo-McCarthyism – distractions from, and
weapons deployed against the affirmative project of building a reformist, egalitarian
social democracy -- are their turf. The ordinary depredations of freedom that stem from
the success of that project itself, simply put, do not count.

The Future of American Liberalism

How healthy is the liberal tradition in America today? Ironically enough, the
panic being sent up by academic reformers that we are on the verge of losing all our
rights and liberties is perhaps the clearest sign that it is alive and well. And here I am
not making the claim that (thank God) there are some people willing to stand up for our
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liberties, while others are trying to get rid of them, so as long as they wail, we as a society
still have some hope. I am arguing instead that panics over the impending loss of
liberties, and the collapse of our democratic experiment are constitutive of American
liberalism itself, both when those panics, in my normative assessment, raise valid
concerns, and when they are made by people who are clearly off their rockers. These
claims about lost rights – whether made by Anti-federalists, slave-owners, pro-business
conservatives, the Freedmen, the denizens of the Cato Institute, the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, or postings on the Law and Courts
and Constitutional Law listservs -- indicate to me that the framework we argue within
continues to place a very high premium on an individual and his rights. Although it is
claimed that the other side in any one of these fights has failed to place a high premium
on individual rights, this seems to me to be very rarely the case, at least for any extended
period of time.

Few (and the greatest exception here may be the early twentieth century

progressives, before they rose to political power) have dismissed rights claims out of
hand and more or less categorically unworthy of consideration.

To be sure, the other

side will often evince statist inclinations in certain areas, and be more welcoming of
different rights and different rights instantiations than those who lodge the charge at them
of being indifferent to individual rights. But it seems very clear to me that Iraq or no
Iraq, Tribe or no Tribe, the discussion is still framed in terms of rights. I don’t see that
that has changed at all in recent years, and, as such, the Hartzian tradition is alive and
well.
Recent work on civil liberties in wartime by Mark Graber suggests, in fact, that
some panic about the possibilities of lost rights due to the war may very well be in order
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on the other side of the political divide. Graber has suggested (like Randolph Bourne)
that war is the health of the state. He then goes on to argue that the growth of the state in
wartime has served to expand American liberty. But, of course, this assessment depends
largely on the sorts of rights one chooses to count as progress.22 It may very well be the
case that the less alarmed the reformists become over the state of freedom in modern
America, and the ostensibly impending demise of Hartzian liberalism (such as by a
Democratic victory in the aftermath of the failures of the Second Iraq War), the more
alarmed we should actually be.

Regardless, the America we have now is essentially the

same America we had, through wars and waves of reformist campaigns that shaped the
modern administrative state, since the earliest years of the twentieth century.

If Hartz’s

reading was relevant in the 1950s, when it was first published, it is just as relevant today.
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